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CHAPTER 5 
European Integration, Global Governance and International Relations 
Jens-Uwe Wunderlich 
 
Introduction 
 
The European integration process has inspired a rich and still growing body of 
scholarship that is unique in many aspects. Since the 1950s, analysts have been 
fascinated by the developments in Western Europe where the evolving institutional 
framework of the European Communities successfully challenged more traditional 
views of world politics, themselves based on an explicit distinction between domestic 
affairs (what is going on within states) and international relations (what is going on 
between states). European integration seemed to provide an entirely new paradigm for 
the organisation of international affairs, based on multilateralism and cooperation 
rather than emphasising self-help and balance-of-power. European integration 
scholarship emerged to provide a refreshing contrast to the dominance of realist 
thinking in the academic field of International Relations. Indeed, for some time 
integration theory in the form of neofunctionalism offered the most convincing 
challenge to the stranglehold of neorealism on international affairs. At the empirical 
level, European integration questioned the central concept upon which traditional 
thinking of world politics in general, and the realist tradition in particular, was based – 
the Westphalian state, with its explicit connection between sovereignty and territory. 
European integration was fuelled by a desire to overcome the flaws of the 
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Westphalian system. The anarchical structure created by the Westphalian system only 
led to a perpetual security dilemma. The two world wars had amply demonstrated the 
consequent lack of trust and an emphasis on self-help, leading to armament, balance-
of-power behaviour and warfare. Thus, one of the main motivating factors kick-
starting the European project was the over-riding concern with finding a solution to 
the security dilemma arising out of the absence of a central authority above state level 
(i.e. anarchy). Concerted efforts focused on reigning in sovereignty and the power of 
the state and on transcending nationalism. And hence the supranational institutions, 
the very antithesis of the Westphalian state, which are unique to European integration. 
 
It has often been argued that European integration has evolved beyond Westphalia, 
creating post-Westphalian modes of governance in Europe in the process. Decision- 
and policy-making has become increasingly decentralised across several levels of 
authority (the sub-national, the national and the European Union levels). However, 
even in such a multilevel governance structure, the state survives. After all, the 
contemporary European Union (EU) rests on compromise, combining supranational 
and intergovernmental features in an idiosyncratic manner. The pooling of 
sovereignty in some carefully negotiated areas has enhanced the effectiveness of the 
states allowing them to better respond to the challenges of, first, the Cold War and, 
second, the globalisation process. Yet the state is no longer the only actor of 
consequence in European policy-making. Depending on the policy area, decision-
making is being shared between various sub-national groups, government departments 
and European institutions. Private actors are also gaining in influence. Thus, European 
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integration is a unique response to the challenges, empirical and conceptual, arising 
out of the inadequacies of the Westphalian system, exacerbated by globalisation.  
 
For over fifty years now an impressive body of literature on European integration has 
evolved, dealing with first-order normative, conceptual and empirical issues around 
international affairs. EU studies scholarship, therefore, should offer a rich repository 
for those studying International Relations and Global Governance.1 However, for a 
variety of reasons, the outline of which is beyond the scope of this chapter, this is 
unfortunately not the case. As Alex Warleigh-Lack outlines in his contribution to this 
volume, this state of affairs is no longer tenable. As he states, it is time to review the 
potential contributions of EU studies to those interested in international affairs and 
global governance. This chapter aims to do just that. It will focus on two particular 
strengths of the EU studies literature. First, for more than twenty years, there has been 
work on the intra-European dynamics of integration and Europeanisation. Multilevel 
governance and network approaches are well-developed within EU studies. This 
should be of interest to global governance scholars who regard multilevel governance 
as a unique way of analysing post-Westphalian international affairs. And, second, EU 
studies goes beyond Westphalian perspectives of world politics. Yet the Westphalian 
model and sovereignty still dominate the theoretical and normative lenses of 
International Relations. This is particularly true when it comes to questions of 
actorness in contemporary world politics. Indeed, to date International Relations lacks 
any systematic discussion on actorness beyond the state. Hence, globalisation poses 
                                                 
1 For the purposes of this chapter, the term EU studies refers to the study of the EU, its institutions, EU 
policy-making processes, European integration theory and history. See also Alex Warleigh-Lack’s 
chapter in this volume. 
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severe conceptual challenges to the discipline. EU studies, on the other hand, has a 
long tradition in dealing with conceptual change and overcoming the state-centric 
straight jacket that restricts International Relations.  
 
Multilevel Governance  
 
The introduction to this volume has outlined that current world politics is in a state of 
flux. The traditional analytical and conceptual tools of International Relations are a bit 
rusty for the analysis of contemporary world politics.  In an international environment 
dominated by the forces of globalisation, states find their autonomy to set independent 
national objectives measurably reduced. The result has been an increase in 
decentralisation and the emergence of more informal modes of governance. 
Devolutionary processes in many countries are empowering sub-national actors while 
an increase in and expansion of international regulative regimes and multilateral 
organisations enhances the institutional global governance framework. Globalisation 
is breaking with the formal framework of the Westphalian state based on exclusive 
territorial sovereignty and replacing it with a more fluid multilevel global governance 
structure. Governance is increasingly shared among various actors such as municipal 
authorities, government agencies and international organisations. Private actors such 
as civil society organisations, industrial organisations and multinational companies 
have also increasing access to the governance complex. Scholars such as Scholte 
speak in this context of post-sovereign governance characterised by increasing levels 
of sub-state and supra-state governance alongside national governance (1997, 2005). 
Additionally, globalisation has led to an increase in direct transborder links between 
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subnational authorities, political elites, government officials and business and civil 
society actors. 
 
In this interdependent world an understanding of world politics that primarily 
emphasises interstate relations and concentrates on interstate conflict and cooperation 
is insufficient. The scope of analysis has to be broadened to include a variety of new 
issues and actors such as the multiple roles of non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs), multinational corporations (MNCs), transnational advocacy networks, civil 
society actors, citizens groups, domestic and transnational lobbies. The separation 
between high politics (security and diplomacy) and so-called low politics (issues of 
political economy, human rights, intellectual property, labour rights, migration, the 
environment, information technology etc.) that has characterised state-centric IR is no 
longer tenable.  Thus, the Global Governance literature is increasingly turning toward 
multilevel governance approaches to better understand the empirical realities of 
contemporary world politics.2  
 
This is not an entirely new analytical framework. Within the last twenty years, 
multilevel governance approaches have attained a certain prominence within the study 
of European integration. The European project has created a unique framework for 
European policy-making where decision-making power is dispersed across several 
levels and, thereby, facilitated the creation of a much more diverse political space. 
Multilevel governance approaches within EU studies emphasise the fluidity between 
                                                 
2 Examples of this global governance literature include: Rosenau and E.-O. Czempiel (1992), Young 
(1999), Behrens (2002), Cooper et al. (2002), Held and McGrew (2002) , Ba and Hoffmann (2005), 
Wilkinson (2005). 
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several tiers of authority and the interconnectedness between institutions and actors 
within political and regulatory decision-making process that are typical for the EU.3 
They explicitly acknowledge the variety of public and private actors involved in EU 
decision-making and transcend state-centrism, analysing public and private aspects of 
governance as well as formal and informal, institutionalised and non-institutionalised 
structures (Wunderlich 2007: 12). EU studies and Global Governance scholars are 
interested in similar phenomena. Both study the regulatory and institutional 
implications of globalisation and the resulting increasing interdependencies. Both sets 
of scholars are investigating the transformation of world politics and the role of the 
state. And both are interested in the expansion of the role of sub-state and regional/ 
international actors alike. A multilevel governance perspective overcomes the 
inadequacies of the Westphalian model in an increasingly interconnected world, a fact 
increasingly recognised by Global Governance scholars but already well-entrenched 
within EU studies.4 
 
Two leading EU multilevel governance scholars, Marks and Hooghe, distinguish 
between two approaches to multilevel governance: Type I and Type II (2004). Type I 
is concerned with power sharing between governments and is closely related to 
contemporary federalism. In Type II: 
 
[J]urisdictions are aligned not just at a few levels, but operate on numerous 
territorial scales; in which jurisdictions are task-specific rather than general 
                                                 
3 For EU multilevel governance scholarship see: Marks et al. (1996), Hooghe and Marks (2001), Bache 
and Flinder (2004), Jessop (2004), Marks and Hooghe (2004), Rosenau (2004). 
4 On this topic please see also Lee Miles’ chapter in this volume. 
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purpose; and where jurisdictions are intended to be flexible rather than 
durable. This conception is predominant among neoclassical political 
economists and public choice theorists, but also summarize the ideas of 
several scholars of federalism, local government, international relations, and 
European studies (Marks and Hooghe 2004: 21). 
 
EU multilevel governance scholarship, therefore, sits very well with students of 
globalisation and global governance. Both are asking similar questions and are 
interested in very similar problems. The EU multilevel governance literature has been 
developed to make sense of EU policy-making processes. A similar mode of analysis 
is being applied by Global Governance scholars and helps to focus on the variety of 
actors, public and private, at different levels, in various parts of the world. To 
summarise, multilevel governance overcomes state-centric views of world politics. It 
can also be regarded as a strategy to organise governance in an increasingly complex 
and interdependent world where international and subnational actors have acquired 
relative autonomy and have joined states and their agencies at the international level. 
To sum up, multilevel governance approaches offer an analytical viewpoint and a 
strategy for not only the EU policy-making system but also for the contemporary 
global governance complex.  
 
International Actorness 
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European integration is an interesting case study for the effective management of 
globalisation through a multilevel governance structure. Far from being a 
marginalized idiosyncratic regional organisation, the EU has fundamentally changed 
our conception of international actorness.  International Relations as an academic 
subject has been dominated by state-centric conceptions of world politics. Nowhere is 
this more apparent than in the neorealist school of thought. In a nutshell, neorealism 
assumes that the basic condition of world politics is anarchy, i.e. the absence of any 
legitimate level of authority above state level. This condition follows from the 
existence of sovereign, territorial-based Westphalian states. Neorealist theory suggests 
that the anarchical structure of world politics generates a perpetual security dilemma 
(very similar to a Hobbesian state of nature scenario) where individual states have no 
choice but to rely on power and self-help mechanisms to ensure their very survival in 
an ultimately dangerous international environment. The state then becomes the 
principal focus of analysis for realists because it represents the only location for 
security, justice and morality. It also represents a primary concentration of power. 
Thus, traditional International Relations theory in general, and the neorealist school of 
thought in particular, has tied the concept of international actorness to the state, a 
sovereign Westphalian state to be more precise. Actors in international affairs are, 
therefore, assessed against the state and sovereignty. This inherent state-centrism is 
very visible in the vocabulary used - states are fully-fledged international actors, 
while other actors are lower down the hierarchy and are usually described as ‘non-
state’ or ‘non-governmental’ actors.  
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In contrast to realist/ neorealist accounts, the neoliberal tradition expressively allows 
for the impact of such non-state actors (i.e. multinational enterprises, regional and 
international organizations, non-governmental organizations etc). However, even 
neoliberalism underlines the centrality of the sovereign state as an international actor. 
Nor does neoliberalism offer an alternative concept of actorness other than in relation 
to the Westphalian state. And while the stranglehold on the discipline that neorealism 
and neoliberalism have exerted in the past has been decisively broken, there has been 
little attempt to address the consequences for the concept of actorness in a systematic 
manner in the general International Relations literature. Even within the current 
debates in International Relations theory, the spectre of the sovereign state continues 
to loom large in any descriptions of international actorness.  
 
Within EU studies, however, the conceptualisation of actorness can look back at a 
long tradition, dating back to the 1970s when in Western Europe realist conceptions 
of international actorness were increasingly challenged by the evolution of the 
European Communities. Since then a steady stream of scholars has been engaged in 
assessing the actorness of the emerging European Community (EC). This literature 
can be divided into two broad streams. One thematic area studies the policy processes 
and internal dynamics that provide the EC/ EU with actorness. A second looks at the 
involvement of the EC/ EU in international relations and the wider implications of the 
EC/ EU’s external engagement for its own agency and actorness.   
 
During the early days, the aim was to develop a general, more comprehensive 
framework of actorness. Focusing on the particularities of the EC and European 
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integration, it was hoped, would lead to possible generalisations regarding the concept 
of actorness. And, indeed, any serious discussion on actorness and European studies 
has to start with Gunnar Sjöstedt’s pioneering work (1977). Sjöstedt focused on actor 
capacity, allowing for a differentiation between strong and weak actors in the 
international system. He also stressed the importance of purposive action of an actor 
with regard to other actors. More recently, Allen and Smith (1991, 1998) added to the 
debate by introducing ‘presence’, where presence is defined as legitimacy and 
capacity to act and to mobilize resources, and the perception an actor generates about 
itself. Christopher Hill (1993) pays particular attention to the formation of actor 
capacity in the EC/ EU, coming to the conclusion that there is a ‘capability-
expectations gap’, i.e. a divergence between what the EC/ EU can actually do and 
what it is increasingly expected to do. Antje Herrberg (1997) identifies the EU as a 
complex system which at different times and across different issue areas will prioritise 
different factors. She concludes that EU actorness depends to a significant degree on 
the level of integration. Thus, EU actorness depends on the policy area under 
consideration. Cohesion, therefore, is important for our understanding of actorness, 
especially with regard to effective actorness. Subsequently, the actor capacity of the 
EU is more developed in the area of Common Commercial Policy (CCP), where the 
Community method of policy-making dominates, than in Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP), which remains subject to intergovernmental cooperation.  
 
Richard Whitman (1998) highlights that the EU has an identifiable and coherent 
international identity, thereby focusing on the external dimension of the concept of 
regional identity. Of particular significance for discussion on actorness with regard to 
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the EU’s external policies are the elaborations of Jupille and Caporaso (1998) and 
Bretherton and Vogler (1999). Both works put forward criteria-based approaches to 
the analysis of the actorness of the EU. Jupille and Caporaso emphasize four factors: 
recognition, authority (decision-making structures, legal competence), autonomy 
(institutional independence) and cohesion (the ability to reach a common position). 
Bretherton and Vogler’s construction of the actorness of the EU is determined by 
three factors: presence (the relationship between international developments and 
external expectations), opportunity (external dynamics that might foster or hinder the 
construction of EU actorness) and capacity (the capabilities necessary to respond to 
opportunities and external expectations). 
 
These contributions have not gone entirely unnoticed outside the field. New 
Regionalism scholars in particular have followed the scholarship on EU actorness 
with great interest. An important contribution to our understanding of regional 
actorness has been Björn Hettne’s new regionalism approach and his concept of 
regioness (Hettne 1996, 2004). Emerging in the 1990s, Hettne’s new regionalism 
approach located regional phenomena within the context of globalization and 
systemic (extra-regional) forces rather than concentrating on intra-regional factors, 
which remains a feature of a significant proportion of scholarship on European 
integration. Most importantly, Hettne emphasized the possibility for regional agency 
and the construction of regional space. Hettne outlines that regions are ‘subjects in the 
making’, i.e. on the way to becoming international actors in their own right (Hettne 
2007).5 Focusing on Western Europe and borrowing from Bretherton and Vogler, 
                                                 
5 See also Hettne’s chapter in this volume. 
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Hettne argues convincingly that the actorness of regions emerges through the 
interplay of regioness (relative cohesion), presence (impact on the international 
environment) and purposive actorness (the ability to influence international order).  
 
While Hettne’s work is another good indicator for the synergies between European 
studies and International Relations it is possible to go even a step further. Rather than 
restricting ourselves to regions as emerging international actors alone it is possible to 
draw up a set of criteria that make for an international actor (state and non-state actor 
alike), to compare such actors and to assess the capacity of such actors. The discussed 
EU studies literatures have demonstrated that it is possible to divorce actorness from 
sovereignty. The remainder of the chapter will outline such a set of criteria and briefly 
map ways of operationalising them. These criteria include institutional identity 
(internal identity and recognition), presence, institutionalisation and capability. 
 
Internal self-understanding/ identity 
 
The concept of self-perception relates to issues such as identity, self-image, as well as 
perception and recognition by others. Collective identities have played a significant 
role in the emergence of the Westphalian state system. Nation-states, very much like 
international or regional organisations, non-governmental organisations or even 
private enterprises, are collective actors. Collective identities contain an external and 
an internal dimension. The internal side, which provides a sense of community and 
inclusion, leads us to the external side of identity, related to a sense of difference and 
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exclusion. Questions of belonging such as ‘Who are we?’/ ‘Who belongs?’ inevitably 
lead to questions such as ‘Who are we not?’ and ‘Who does not belong?’ The 
construction of such a community of belonging automatically leads to the creation of 
the ‘other’. It is pertinent to note that identities, like international actorness, are 
context related and issue-specific. Thus, international actors, like states, are ideational 
constructs, masking group action, and questions of identity run through every single 
aspect of international actorness. Furthermore, actorness and actor-identity are not 
total but are always context-specific. 
 
External recognition 
 
At first glance, de jure recognition in the international system appears to be reserved 
to state-actors endowed with sovereignty. To date it is impossible for non-state actors 
to have a seat in the United Nations or to enter official diplomatic relations. The 
international system is biased in favour of state actors. However, that does not imply 
that non-state actors cannot gain recognition as international actors. We need to move 
away from sovereignty and diplomatic recognition. Instead, one could focus on 
processes of mutual interaction between different actors. Dealing with an entity as a 
collective international actor presupposes and grants some form of recognition, 
bestows actorness and enhances actor-identity. 
 
International presence 
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International presence refers here to the capacity to actively influence the external 
environment. International presence is influenced by the identity of an actor and 
contributes directly to recognition. For example, agenda setting and participation in 
international organisations and international dialogues can serve as good indicators 
here. This emphasis on presence and capacity also highlights that actorness in context 
specific. Powerful transnational companies might have the capacity to influence 
economic policy-making at a transnational scale. This provides them with a presence 
in financial or economic matters. At the same time, their presence in geo-strategic or 
security matters may remain marginal. Actorness is not absolute. 
 
Institutionalisation 
 
Institutionalisation is an important feature for the concept of actorness, constraining 
and shaping actorness. Institutions can be described as formal and informal rules as 
well as behavioural norms and codes of conduct constituting prescriptions and 
ordering repeated and interdependent relations. Institutions come as highly 
formalized, written, well-codified documents, treaties or legal arrangements. They 
also come in more informal forms denoting norms about what is deemed to be 
appropriate behaviour. Institutionalisation, therefore, contextualises international 
actorness. To put it differently, the institutional set-up determines actor qualities. With 
regard to actorness it is useful to imagine a continuum of institutionalisation ranging 
from very informal arrangements to highly formalised and legalised institutionalism. 
It is important where an actor is located along this continuum. The degree of 
institutionalisation has consequences for the level of actorness inasmuch as it 
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determines the presence of an international actor and policy instruments and, to a 
lesser degree, its recognition and self-understanding. Low-level institutionalisation, 
characterised by a preference for informal arrangements, sets clear limits for potential 
actorness. Decision-making under such circumstances is inevitably subject to 
inefficiencies, drawn out and limited, depending on the lowest common denominator. 
High-level institutionalisation, on the other hand enhances actorness somewhat by 
increasing the efficiency of decision-making by clearly demarcating levels of 
authority and competence. Participants are joined via strong formal and legal ties, 
making it much more difficult to withdraw. The international actorness potential of, 
for example, civil society actors such as charities, social movements, advocacy 
groups, depends on institutionalisation and formality. The same can be said for 
regional organisations such as the EU, ASEAN or Mercosur.   
 
Capabilities (to provide capacity and to achieve outcomes) 
 
Policy instruments of public and private actors alike provide capacity that helps to 
project interests, achieve outcomes and enhances actor identity. Actor capacity is 
ultimately dependent on the available instruments. 
 
This set of criteria has been directly devolved from the various contributions on EU 
actorness in the EU studies literature. If applied to contemporary world politics it 
takes a much wider variety of actors (such as, for instance, states, global and regional 
organisations, civil society actors, economic actors) into consideration and escapes the 
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straight-jacket imposed by the explicit and implicit state-centrism that still dominates 
International Relations. It offers a description of international actorness that fits much 
better with the realities of contemporary world politics.  
 
Conclusion 
 
There is significant potential for intellectual bridge-building between EU studies and 
International Relations. First, although developed with the idiosyncrasies of EU 
policy-making environment in mind, multilevel governance, if carefully applied, 
offers a valuable analytical tool for understanding global governance. It deals with 
issues of governance, legitimacy and accountability beyond the state.  
 
And second, EU studies literature has enhanced our conceptual understanding of 
actorness beyond the Westphalian model. States may be distinctive international 
actors, endowed with sovereignty, but sovereignty is not a pre-requisite for actorness. 
Traditional International Relations-based approaches tend to confuse actorness with 
statehood and this ultimately limits any analysis of an increasingly complex and 
multilayered global arena. Globalisation and new modes of global governance 
emerging in the aftermath of the Cold War force ‘an expansion of actorness beyond 
the traditional state-centric model’ (Cooper et al, 2008: 1). The state no longer has a 
monopoly of economic, military and social power. Policy-making at the national and 
the international level is becoming more complex and diversified. The Westphalian 
model, therefore, is past its sell-by-date. What we need is a much more flexible 
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understanding of actorness that includes the state but also a variety of other kinds of 
actors. Take, for instance, countries lacking diplomatic recognition but which may 
possess some form of actorness (such as Taiwan). We need a concept that sees 
actorness as fluid and dynamic. Actorness can be attained and it can be lost (consider, 
for instance, failing states). And, finally, we need a concept that is versatile enough to 
consider actors that are strong players in any one dimension (economic, political, 
social or cultural), rather than all capabilities being bundled together as in traditional 
conceptions of the state. Thus, we would be able to take into account international 
organisations such as the EU, NATO or the UN as well as NGOs, MNEs and 
investment banks, all of whom play critical roles alongside, and sometimes above, the 
state-level, with all the capabilities and capacities of an actor.  
